
















Business services and 
the Baumol disease 
Henk Kox*
Abstract
The business services industry represents a large and fast-
growing chunk of the Dutch economy, approaching the size of
the total manufacturing industry. The industry, however, has
displayed stagnating productivity growth, accompanied in
some years by a fall in productivity. Do these stylised facts
imply that the Dutch economy is inevitably headed for the
“Baumol disease”? Investigating this question, this article
reviews policy options that might improve the productivity
record of the business services industry and strengthen its
contributions to the productivity of client industries.
Introduction
During the last decade, the business services industry was one of
the most dynamic sectors in the Dutch economy. What are the
macroeconomic consequences of this process, given the stagnat-
ing productivity growth of this industry? This paper uses the
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“Baumol disease” as a reference framework (see box on next
page). Baumol (1967) analysed how an expanding low-productiv-
ity services sector might bring down the growth rate of the entire
economy. A number of stylised facts, related to the recent growth
of the business services industry, suggest that its performance
may contribute to the advent of Baumol’s disease in the
Netherlands:
1
• Labour productivity growth in the business services industry
lags behind that of the rest of the market sector. Figures 1 and 2
show that this is the case in the Netherlands and in other OECD
countries.
• Production growth and employment growth in the business 
services industry was much faster than in the rest of the market
sector. 
• Wages in the business services industry and the rest of the 
market sector grew at about the same pace.
• Demand for business services grew despite the increasing rela-
tive price of the sector compared to the market sector average. 










Figure 1 Productivity growth gap: difference
between labour productivity growth in
BS industry and the total market sector,
selected countries, 1981-1990 and 
1991-1996
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Figure 2 Change in labour productivity per hour


















Baumol (1967) described the consequences of a growth
model in which the services sector has only limited potential
for productivity growth, while demand for services is 
relatively insensitive to price increases. The most productive
sector is the wage leader for the services industry. In this
economy, an increasing share of labour will be employed by
the services sector. The imminent ‘disease’ is that the growth
rate of the total economy falls, while the relative price of 
services rises.
A superficial diagnosis on the basis of these stylised facts might
conclude that the development of the business services industry
will inevitably contribute to Baumol’s disease in the Dutch econ-
omy. That conclusion may be wrong for several reasons. Baumol
focussed on consumer services, whereas business services pro-
duces intermediary inputs. This at least makes the story a bit
more complex, particularly since there are indirect productivity
effects (see below). The paper argues that policy options are avail-
able for strengthening both direct and indirect productivity contri-
butions of the business services industry. 
Indirect productivity effects 
Since the 1980s, business services account for an increasing share
of total intermediary inputs in the Netherlands. Initially, this was
mainly due to outsourcing of relatively simple internal services to
outside services firms. Branches with standardised services like
industrial cleaning, catering and security benefited most from
this tendency. From the 1990s onwards, outsourcing shifted
towards knowledge-intensive business services that were often tai-
lor-made for particular clients. Firms benefiting from this trend
were in IT, engineering, legal services, management consultancy,
industrial design, marketing, and even commercial R&D. Often
outsourcing was no longer pure replacement of internal services,
because of quality improvement, specialisation and innovation.
Knowledge-intensive business services have achieved an impor-
tant position in the national innovation system. As a source of
external information for innovating companies, business services
appear to rank before universities.
2 Knowledge-intensive business
services contribute in three ways to the modern knowledge infra-
structure:
• Original innovations. Firms in software, engineering and con-
tract research actively contribute to technological innovations.
Firms in other branches are active innovators in non-technolog-
ical areas such as organisational development, firm strategy,
human resource management, PR or marketing.
• Knowledge diffusion. Business services firms are in the unique
position of being able to look into the ‘knowledge kitchen’ of
client firms. They observe localised, tacit knowledge solutions
in client firms. But since their horizon is wider, they can more
easily conceptualise such solutions, and select ‘best practice’
solutions to more common business problems. Such ‘best prac-
tice’ information is subsequently introduced as input when they
serve new clients. With regard to many competence areas, 
business services firms bring clients to the efficiency frontier.
• Surpassing human capital indivisibilities. The availability of
knowledge-intensive business services reduces economies of
scale with regard to knowledge and human capital. Even small
client firms now have access to specialist knowledge and 
specialist skills that had once been exclusively the domain of
large firms that could afford to employ such specialists. 
Summing up, business services firms generate positive productiv-
ity effects in client industries. Several studies quantify indirect
productivity contributions of the business services industry (e.g.
Antonelli, 1999; Tomlinson, 2000; Müller and Zenker, 2000).
When this indirect productivity contribution grows along with the
size of the business services industry, it may well outweigh the
effect of the stagnating productivity in business services industry
itself. The indirect productivity effects thus provide a counter-
balance to the Baumol disease tendency. But there is more. 
Stagnating productivity growth in business services no fait 
accompli
Baumol (1967) starts from the assumption that the services indus-
try has few opportunities for productivity increase, because its
product is inherently labour intensive. While this may be true for
some services, the business services industry still has many
opportunities left for productivity increase. Still to be tackled are
some of the root causes of X-inefficiencies in this industry: lack of
market transparency, diseconomies of small firm size, and mod-
est internal innovation. Each of these three factors will be dis-
cussed before we subsequently embark on policy options. 27
(A) Lack of market transparency and weak competition lower 
efficiency pressure
Competition intensity and market transparency increase the pres-
sure on margins, and the pressure to remove X-inefficiencies (e.g.
Martin and Theeuwes, 2001; Felsö et al., 2001). Conversely, weak
competition and opaque markets have an adverse effect on aver-
age cost efficiency. The latter condition applies in large parts of
the markets for knowledge-intensive business services. Product
differentiation, up even to the level of client-specific products,
reduces comparability of products and prices. Competition in
markets for knowledge-intensive services is dampened by the
occurrence of switching costs (invested time, information) on the
side of the clients. 
Asymmetrical information further constricts transparency in
these markets. The products are experience goods or credence
goods – meaning that buyers lack quality information before pur-
chase of the service, or even shortly after obtaining the service.
Buyers solve this information problem by navigating strongly on
the basis of vested market reputations. Firms that provided a good
product yesterday are expected to do the same tomorrow. Market
reputations differ by type of clients and by geographical area.
Most small firms in business services just have local reputations,
with a small network of clients. Services firms with prestigious
and large customers are easily taken to be high-quality providers.
The reputation mechanism leads to a system of segmented mar-
kets in which different prices and tariffs co-exist. Competition
among market segments on the basis of price and cost levels plays
a subordinate role. Hence, monopolistic competition is ubiqui-
tous, due to the combination of market segmentation and product
differentiation. Apart from that, most branch markets have a
small top segment in which a handful of multinational players 
– meeting each other in several national markets – interact as oli-
gopolists. Many of their client firms are also multinationals. If for-
eign service providers compete with domestic firms, their main
domestic challengers are large nationally oriented service
providers. The latter operate in the most competitive market seg-
ment (CSES 2001), with competition coming from middle-sized
companies, multinational companies, and sometimes even from
small international specialists.
(B) Sub-optimal firm size reduces productivity levels. 
Strong empirical evidence was found that small business services
firms, on average, have lower labour productivity than firms with
50 employees or more.
3 Figure 3 shows that labour productivity is
a positive function of firm size. Nonetheless, the business services
industry is overwhelmingly a small firms industry. Fifty-eight 
percent of Dutch firms in 2000 had no employees, and another 
30 percent had fewer than five employees. How can this be 
reconciled with the potential scale economies? 
One reason can be found in the influx of many small-scale
entrants. The share of small firms in the company population is
steadily increasing. Entry in this industry faces hardly any barriers
with regard to fixed-capital investment. Excess demand for busi-
ness services in the 1990s created a mild market climate for new
entrants. The Dutch business services industry had higher market
growth than the service industries in any other OECD country,
both in terms of employment and in terms of value added.
However, market competition may be less selective in times of
excess demand. Van der Wiel (1999) found that new entrants had
on average a lower productivity than incumbents. Massive entry
numbers thus aggravated rather than alleviated this industry’s
productivity growth problem. Market segmentation creates a
growth hurdle for small and innovative firms. It also explains why
the inflow of many small entrants did not have more impact on
average productivity of the business services industry. 
Another, more structural, reason for the high incidence of
small firms relates to the position of key employees and the intra-
company distribution of rents. In knowledge-intensive services,
employees per firm










Figure 3 Average turnover per employee in

































market reputations and client goodwill are bound up with the
(perceived) quality of a company’s knowledge assets, most of
which, rather than being firm-bound, are embodied in
employees.
4 Intellectual property rights such as patents, copy-
rights and brand names hardly play a role in the business services
industry. The perceived qualities of some employees, labelled key
employees, are crucial to the market reputation of the service
firm. Such employees carry and ‘own’ tacit knowledge and intangi-
ble competences that are essential in the competitive process.
Much of their job activities are implemented at the client’s prem-
ises rather than at the ‘home’ office. For clients, they are the ‘face’
of the services firm. However, for the owner of the services firm,
these employees are often monopolist providers of unique labour
services – monopolist, because they cannot easily be substituted by
other employees, and because they find it relatively easy to quit
and start for themselves. On-the-job training takes time and is
costly, and employee substitution may cost client goodwill. Key
employees often have considerable discretionary decision power
about the way they do their jobs. Marginal output increments
from their work may be observable only after considerable time
lags, if at all. They work under incomplete or inefficient monitor-
ing, and under incomplete contracts. Job complexity and the 
incidence of contingencies make it virtually impossible for firm
owners to write water-tight contracts sealing off all future contin-
gencies (e.g. Foss 1999). On the basis of their strong intra-com-
pany bargaining position, key employees may squeeze out part 
of the service firm’s residual profit income in the form of above-
average salaries and fringe benefits. For small entrepreneurs, the
key employee phenomenon may be a growth disincentive that
outweighs the ‘technical’ advantage of achieving higher average
labour productivity by growing larger. 
(C) Modest internal innovation effort
Micro data research shows that labour productivity in innovative
firms grows more than in non-innovative business services firms.
Especially the introduction of non-technological innovations (in
marketing, company strategy, and management, for example)
appeared to be correlated strongly with labour productivity growth
(Van der Wiel 2001). Compared with business services firms in
benchmark countries, Dutch firms lagged behind in terms of
innovation expenditure. A shortfall in internal innovation effort
may imply that business services providers fail to grasp opportu-
nities to strengthen their own productivity. 
Three factors were identified that contribute to stagnating produc-
tivity growth in the business services industry – lack of competi-
tion, scale disadvantages, and shortfalls in innovation expendi-
ture. Improvements seem possible on all three issues. The prime
responsibility for this rests with the firms and their industry asso-
ciations. The downward impact of the key-employee mechanism
on productivity could be reduced by giving more attention to
internal trainee programmes, codification of knowledge and other
forms of knowledge management. By organising demonstration
projects, industry organisations could play an enabling role.
However, if such initiatives hinge only on motivation and infor-
mation, then why have companies failed to grasp the available
opportunities? Some of the aforementioned solutions seem to be
subject to scale thresholds: they may simply fall beyond the reach
of small firms. Structural market failures also play a role, particu-
larly in the markets for client-specific and knowledge-intensive
business services. The text box (next page) distinguishes four
types of market failure.
Policy options for strengthening productivity and innovation
This section sketches some policy options for tackling the market
failures in the business services industry. Some options may
require new policy instruments, while it may be sufficient in
other cases simply to refocus existing policies, bringing policy
attention for the business services industry more in line with this
sector’s economic weight and function.
Productivity improvement can be expected from measures that
allow firms to benefit more from scale economies. Figure 3 sug-
gests that, given the small size of the average firm, substantial
productivity gains must be within reach. Current policies empha-
sise the importance of starting companies. However, this industry
has already experienced a considerable inflow of new entrants.
Creating incentives for firms to grow beyond the micro-scale, and
thus gain the associated productivity improvements, seems to be
more appropriate. Reducing administrative burdens for expand-
ing firms might be a useful step in this regard. Scale advantages
are related to fixed costs. Intangible assets such as innovation
potential, expertise and other human capital assets are the most
important fixed assets in this industry. The juridical instruments
to protect such intangible assets – i.e. patents, copyrights and
brand names – could form the crystallisation nucleus for scale
















the creation of wider possibilities for intellectual property rights
on products and innovations could create a basis for more scale
advantages in the business services industry. Consider, for exam-
ple, patents with short duration for services products. US experi-
ences with patentability of business methods could be instructive
in this regard. Enhanced possibilities for claiming intellectual
property rights on innovative services would also stimulate the
innovation process in services. 
Market transparency could be improved by removing elements of
quality-related information asymmetry. Individual service
providers or service firms might apply for a government-sup-
ported, but voluntary quality certificate. Such certificates would
reduce quality uncertainty for clients, making it less risky for
them to opt for certified small firms without an established mar-
ket reputation. Ambitious and innovative small firms would find
it easier to compete in market segments that were once beyond
their reach. The literature on market failure suggests that the 
government should remain involved in such certification schemes.
Competitiveness would be enhanced by opening up domestic
markets for foreign providers. In some branches (like account-
ancy, tax consultancy, engineering and architectural services) for-
eign competition plays a negligible role at present. While the
Dutch market for business services is relatively liberalised com-
pared to other EU countries, many branch-specific regulations
still effectively block foreign market access. Widely diverging
national market rules among EU countries may create prohibitive
information costs for medium-sized firms that could otherwise
have embarked on export activities. Harmonisation of EU market
rules in the business services industry, and mutual recognition of
national quality standards, will lower transaction costs and create
growth incentives for individual firms, leading to overall welfare
gains. Removal of unnecessarily restrictive market access rules
could form an upbeat to a new WTO agreement on trade in 
services. 
Innovation in the knowledge-intensive business services industry
would be strengthened by creating more facilities for intellectual
property rights, and by giving more policy attention to non-tech-
nological innovations. Currently, most policy instruments for
innovation promotion focus on technological and R&D-led inno-
vations. Almost automatically, services firms are under repre-
sented as participants in such policy schemes. Indeed, their inno-
vations are in many cases non-technological, and are seldom
driven by formal R&D expenditure. Stimulation of innovation in
the business services industry will require more policy attention
for non-technological innovations. A further option would be to
widen facilities or establish positive incentives for individual
entrepreneurs and small-firm owners to take refresher courses to
‘keep the knowledge dissemination machine running’.
Small firms make relatively little use of business service
Market failures in business services 
• Imperfect competition. Strong product differentiation
(‘Balkanisation’), market segmentation and monopolistic
competition are prominent market characteristics in
branches with knowledge-intensive services. 
• Positive externalities arise in relation to the industry’s role
in innovation and knowledge diffusion. Only part of these
positive impacts on client firms can be seized upon by busi-
ness services firms. The public good character of the trans-
ferred knowledge and the risk of imitation (through key
employees that resign, or learning-by-looking) limit the
possibility of asking prices that correspond with the mar-
ginal social benefits. Hence, the supply of such knowledge
services is likely to be lower than would be socially desir-
able. Finally, the productivity stagnation in business serv-
ices, and the industry’s own inaptitude to overcome it, can
be considered as a negative growth externality for the rest of
the economy. 
• Information asymmetry arises in the market for knowl-
edge-intensive business services due to client uncertainty
about product quality. Information asymmetry diminishes
market transparency and causes client firms to navigate on
vested market reputations. This in turn leads to market seg-
mentation and reduced competition intensity.
• The lump-sum costs of relevant market information (trans-
action costs) can inhibit market access by small (potential)
client firms. Small firms in other industries appear to make
less use of business services than large firms. Negative wel-
fare effects arise if such small firms remain operating at
















providers, as a consequence of scale disadvantages, quality uncer-
tainty, and lack of information on the possible efficiency benefits
of their services. Information campaigns and demonstration proj-
ects that target small-scale potential users of knowledge-intensive
business services could encourage such firms to make greater use
of such services inputs, thus bringing them closer to the effi-
ciency frontier in their branch. 
Conclusions
Having an expanding business services industry does not auto-
matically propel the Dutch economy onto the path of the Baumol
disease. In order to assess the net contribution of the business
services industry to macroeconomic productivity growth, we must
also account for the industry’s indirect productivity effects. The
latter (innovation, knowledge diffusion) run through client indus-
tries and are mainly positive. Nonetheless, the stagnating produc-
tivity growth in the business services industry itself is a matter for
concern. Some promising policy options tackle the root causes for
the weak productivity record. Increase the transparency of the
industry’s markets, stimulate innovation, and elicit more foreign
competition: these measures will bolster the productivity contri-
butions of business services. 
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Notes
1 The trends are documented in Kox (2002) and CPB (2002). This article is based on these
documents.
2 For the Netherlands, this emerges from CBS (2001, p. 117); Klomp and G. Meinen
(2001).
3 This pattern remained after controlling for non-labour inputs and market share. Similar
patterns emerged from New Cronos micro data for Sweden, France, Belgium and Italy.
4 In branches like accountancy, software maintenance, software design, legal services,
management consultancy, and engineering services, the relevant knowledge assets and
expertise are client-specific rather than generic. 